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Motivation 
•  "CriAcal	  infrastructures	  (CI)	  are	  those	  physical	  and	  cyber-­‐based	  
systems	  essenAal	  to	  the	  minimum	  operaAons	  of	  the	  economy	  
and	  government.	  	  
–  Those	  systems	  are	  so	  vital,	  that	  their	  incapacity	  or	  destrucAon	  would	  have	  
a	  debilitaAng	  impact	  on	  the	  defence	  or	  economic	  security”	  [1].	  
•  CI	  sectors	  include,	  amongst	  others:	  
–  Electricity,	  telecommunicaAon,	  air	  traﬃc	  and	  transport	  sectors.	  
•  CIs	  can	  be	  mutually	  dependent	  
–  A	  failure	  in	  one	  CI	  can	  cascade	  to	  another	  (inter)dependent	  CI	  and	  cause	  
service	  disrupAons.	  	  
[1]	  Clinton,	  W.J.:	  ExecuAve	  order	  13010	  -­‐	  criAcal	  infrastructure	  protecAon.	  Federal	  Register	  6	  
I(138)	  (July	  1996)	  37347	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Motivation 
•  Governments	  and	  ciAzens	  are	  becoming	  aware.	  
	  
•  The	  media	  is	  also	  contribuAng	  to	  public	  awareness:	  
	  
–  TV	  series	  “24”	  season	  7	  	  
–  Government	  is	  worried	  about	  CI	  protecAon	  	  
and	  protected	  every	  CI	  with	  a	  “CIP	  ﬁrewall”	  	  
–  One	  device	  +	  its	  programmer	  	  
•  (Michael	  Latham	  -­‐	  kidnapped)…	  	  
–  …terrorists	  make	  an	  intrusion	  in	  the	  air	  traﬃc	  control	  system	  and	  prove	  that	  	  they	  can	  
control	  all	  (inter)dependent	  CIs	  in	  the	  country.	  
	  
Now	  Jack	  Bauer	  has	  to	  	  
	  ﬁnd	  the	  device…	  	  
	   	  We	  clearly	  need	  beDer	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Introduction 
•  CriAcal	  infrastructures	  (CIs)	  are	  complex	  interacAng	  systems	  providing	  
services	  to	  customers.	  
	  
•  CIs	  may	  depend	  on	  services	  of	  other	  CIs	  
–  (Inter)Dependencies.	  
	  
•  CIs	  diﬀer	  among	  each	  other,	  mainly	  regarding	  
–  The	  services	  they	  provide;	  
–  The	  components	  they	  are	  composed	  of;	  
–  Their	  organisaAonal	  structure.	  
•  In	  an	  amempt	  to	  model	  CIs	  and	  dependencies	  and	  share	  CI	  informaAon	  
–  What	  is	  a	  “common	  ground”	  to	  model	  CIs?	  
–  How	  can	  informaAon	  be	  presented?	  
•  Easy	  to	  exchange	  and	  interpret.	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MICIE FP7 Project - MICIE Alerting System 
•  MICIE	  project	  (www.micie.eu)	  contributes	  in	  three	  main	  areas:	  	  
–  IdenAﬁcaAon	  and	  modelling	  of	  interdependencies	  among	  CIs;	  
–  Development	  of	  risk	  models	  and	  risk	  predicAon	  tools;	  
–  A	  framework	  enabling	  secure	  and	  truspully	  informaAon	  sharing	  among	  CI.	  
•  MICIE	  main	  goal:	  
–  To	   provide,	   in	   “real	   Ame”,	   each	   CI	   Operator	   with	   a	   CI	   risk	   level	   measuring	   the	  
probability	  that,	  in	  the	   	  future,	  he	  will	  loose	  the	  capacity	  of	  provide	  some	  services	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MICIE overall system architecture 
•  Each	  CI	  collects,	  in	  “real-­‐Ame”,	  informaAon	  regarding	  the	  status	  of	  
its	  components.	  	  
–  The	  adaptor	  selects	  proper	  informaAon	  and	  handles	  format	  and	  semanAc	  
conversions.	  	  
–  The	  PredicAon	  Tool	  make	  use	  of	  risk	  models	  to	  assess	  the	  risk	  level	  of	  
monitored	  services.	  
•  CI	  own	  risk	  level	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  risk	  levels	  related	  to	  services	  received	  
from	  partners	  (interdependent)	  CI.	  	  
–  Status	  informaAon	  can	  be	  exchanged	  across	  CI	  using	  the	  SMGW	  allowing	  CI	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MICIE SMGW -  Secure Mediation Gateway 
•  SMGW	  main	  funcAons:	  
–  Provision	  of	  a	  secure	  	  and	  truspully	  cross-­‐CI	  communicaAon	  infrastructure;	  
–  Collect	  informaAon	  about	  the	  local	  CI;	  
–  Retrieve	  informaAon	  about	  the	  other	  interdependent	  CIs	  in	  the	  system; 	  	  
–  Send	  informaAon	  related	  to	  local	  CI	  to	  remote	  CIs;	  
–  ComposiAon	  of	  CIs	  criAcal	  events	  and	  semanAc	  inference;	  
–  Provide	  all	  the	  collected	  informaAon	  to	  the	  predicAon	  tool	  	  
–  Provides	  a	  real-­‐Ame	  view	  about	  idenAﬁed	  risks	  and	  alerts.	  	  
•  The	  SMGW	  design	  guarantees	  mulAple	  security	  requirements:	  
–  e.g.	  ,	  conﬁdenAality,	  integrity,	  availability,	  non	  repudiaAon	  and	  
auditability/traceability.	  	  	  
•  Trust	  and	  reputaAon	  is	  part	  of	  the	  	  SMGW.	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•  The	  SMGW	  MANAGER	  intends	  to	  manage	  all	  SMGW	  aspects.	  	  
•  Developed	  according	  to	  the	  policy	  based	  management	  paradigm.	  
•  It	  also	  performs	  monitoring	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  AudiAng	  Engine	   	  	  
•  can	  also	  act	  as	  Intrusion	  PrevenAon	  and	  DetecAon	  Engine	  by	  
conﬁguring	  	  ﬁrewalls	  in	  the	  communicaAon	  engine.	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SMGW Manager 
•  Provides	  a	  tool	  where	  the	  CI	  operator	  can	  deﬁne,	  in	  a	  high	  level	  
manner,	  the	  behaviour	  he	  pretends	  for	  the	  system.	  
•  Handles	  authorizaAon,	  authenAcaAon	  and	  accounAng,	  for	  both	  
interacAon	  with	  peer	  SMGWs	  and	  all	  the	  internal	  operaAons.	  
•  The	  CI	  operator	  can	  deﬁne	  policies	  addressing	  the	  relaAons	  between	  
local	  SMGW	  and	  foreign	  SMGWs.	  
•  Key	  Components:	  
–  Policy	  Database	  –	  stores	  all	  deﬁned	  policies.	  
–  Policy	  GUI	  –	  interface	  with	  the	  administrator	  of	  the	  SMGW.	  
–  SMGW	  Manager/Policy-­‐based	  Management:	  
•  The	  SMGW	  component	  responsible	  for	  authorizing	  access	  to	  the	  SMGW	  and	  to	  its	  
data.	  It	  acts	  as	  the	  SMGW	  Policy	  Decision	  Point	  (PDP).	  
–  PEP	  -­‐	  Policy	  Enforcement	  Points:	  
•  The	  PEPs	  control	  the	  access	  to	  the	  SMGW	  (communicaAons,	  data)	  based	  on	  the	  
rules	  received	  from	  the	  SMGW	  Manager.	  May	  include	  the	  ﬁrewall,	  the	  VPN	  server,	  
Web	  Server,	  Data	  Access	  Services,	  …	  
–  Trust	  and	  ReputaAon	  System.	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Trust and Reputation for CI Protection 
•  Can	  we	  trust	  informaAon	  received	  from	  peer	  CIs	  /	  Services?	  
–  Monitoring	  components	  can	  be	  faulty;	  
–  The	  peer	  CI	  ICT	  system	  can	  be	  	  compromised,	  sending	  false	  informaAon;	  
–  The	  peer	  CI	  may	  intenAonally	  provide	  inaccurate	  informaAon.	  
•  Is	  the	  behaviour	  of	  peer	  CIs	  /	  Services	  acceptable?	  
–  Has	  the	  monitoring	  framework	  been	  compromised?	  
–  Repeatedly	  trying	  to	  read	  non-­‐authorized	  informaAon?	  	  
•  Answers	  to	  this	  quesAons	  are	  important	  as	  	  
–  The	  CI	  uses	  received	  alerts	  to	  infer	  its	  own	  risk	  levels;	  
–  TrusAng	  false	  informaAon	  aﬀects	  risk	  assessment;	  
–  Shared	  informaAon	  is	  highly	  conﬁdenAal.	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Trust Model 
•  Main	  Goal	  -­‐	  Maintain	  real-­‐Ame	  trust	  informaAon	  about	  
(inter)dependent	  CIs	  and	  CI	  services.	  
•  There	  are	  two	  main	  areas	  where	  trust	  and	  reputaAon	  is	  
applied:	  
–  A	  trust	  indicator	  about	  the	  risk	  alerts	  received	  from	  
(inter)dependent	  CIs	  /	  Services	  (Risk	  alerts	  trust).	  	  
•  This	  indicator	  is	  evaluated	  at	  two	  levels:	  
–  Service	  level,	  evaluaAng	  each	  service	  received	  from	  a	  remote	  CI,	  
reﬂecAng	  trust	  on	  the	  risk	  alerts	  received	  from	  each	  dependent	  service;	  	  
–  CI	  level,	  evaluaAng	  an	  indicator	  for	  each	  interconnected	  CI,	  represenAng	  
the	  reputaAon	  of	  that	  parAcular	  CI.	  	  
–  Understanding	  the	  (inter)dependent	  CIs	  behaviour	  in	  terms	  of	  
ICT	  security	  (Behaviour	  trust).	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Trust and Reputation System 
•  An	  extension	  to	  the	  MICIE	  core	  framework	  
•  The	  Trust	  and	  ReputaAon	  System	  allows:	  
–  To	  associate	  a	  level	  of	  trust	  to	  the	  data	  received	  from	  peer	  CIs,	  	  
as	  well	  as	  to	  its	  own	  internal	  monitoring	  data	  (e.g.	  SCADA	  systems)	  
–  To	  use	  this	  associated	  trust	  level	  to	  enhance	  the	  accuracy	  of	  MICIE	  Risk	  
PredicAon	  Tools.	  
–  To	  detect	  defecAve	  components	  at	  local	  level	  (e.g.	  faulty	  hardware	  
sensors,	  sotware	  bugs)	  which	  consistently	  provide	  inaccurate	  informaAon.	  
–  To	  detect	  partner	  CIs	  /	  Services	  which	  provide	  inconsistent	  informaAon.	  
–  To	  Incorporate	  trust	  indicators	  into:	  
•  The	  risk	  assessment	  tools	  (thus	  limiAng	  the	  impact	  of	  inconsistent	  
informaAon)	  
•  The	  access	  policies	  of	  the	  MICIE	  framework	  	  
(limiAng	  the	  access	  of	  non-­‐trusted	  partners	  to	  sensiAve	  data)	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Trust and Reputation Service – Input sources 
•  Analysis	  of	  past	  data	  provided	  by	  partner/”service”	  
–  Each	  partner	  CI	  provides	  and/or	  receives	  a	  number	  of	  “services”	  	  
(the	  interdependency	  links)	  
–  For	  each	  provided	  “service”	  the	  partner	  CI	  also	  provides	  a	  risk	  assessment	  
esAmate,	  related	  to	  its	  availability	  or	  QoS.	  
–  Compare	  the	  risk	  esAmates	  provided	  over	  Ame,	  for	  each	  “service”,	  against	  the	  
actual	  service	  levels,	  to	  infer	  the	  trusAness	  of	  future	  esAmates.	  
•  Analysis	  of	  partner	  behavior	  
–  If	  the	  partner	  CI	  behaves	  abnormally	  (for	  instance	  trying	  to	  access	  non-­‐authorized	  
data	  or	  using	  non-­‐authorized	  credenAals)	  downgrade	  the	  global	  level	  of	  trusAness	  
associated	  with	  that	  partner	  CI.	  	  	  
•  Human	  factor	  (Op+onal)	  
–  Incorporate	  the	  percepAon	  of	  the	  human	  operator	  about	  each	  partner	  or	  
“service”.	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Risk Alerts Trust Evaluation (1) 
•  An	  Event	  is	  triggered	  in	  a	  situaAon	  in	  which	  the	  received	  risk	  is	  
diﬀerent	  from	  normal,	  the	  monitored	  service	  QoS	  decreased	  or	  
both.	  
•  The	  Event	  accuracy	  is	  deﬁned	  as	  the	  average	  of	  all	  comparisons	  
made	  during	  the	  event.	  
•  The	  trust	  that	  one	  CI	  has	  in	  the	  risk	  esAmates	  received	  for	  a	  
“service”	  provided	  by	  another	  CI	  is	  based	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  each	  
past	  event	  between	  those	  two	  CIs	  (for	  that	  speciﬁc	  “service”)	  
with	  deﬁned	  factors	  depending	  on	  the	  context:	  
–  PenalizaAon	  factor	  (penalize	  larger	  esAmaAon	  errors)	  
–  Aging	  factor	  (recent	  events	  are	  granted	  more	  weigh	  than	  old	  events,	  using	  
an	  aging	  factor	  applied	  to	  each	  event).	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Risk Alerts Trust Evaluation (2) 
•  Event	  accuracy:	  
•  Trust	  that	  CI	  has	  for	  service	  X	  provided	  by	  CI	  B	  :	  
•  K	  -­‐	  PenalizaAon	  factor	  (penalize	  the	  bigger	  diﬀerences)	  
•  D	  -­‐	  Aging	  factor	  (weigh	  recent	  events	  more	  that	  old	  events	  using	  a	  discount	  factor	  
applied	  to	  each	  event).	  
•  N	  –	  Event	  Number	  
•  T(ﬁnal)	  –	  IncorporaAng	  Operator	  trust	  (TO)	  
17 
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Reputation - Multiple Services 
•  It	  is	  possible	  to	  weight	  each	  service	  according	  to	  his	  relevance.	  	  
–  for	  instance,	  giving	  more	  weight	  on	  more	  criAcal	  services	  and	  less	  weight	  to	  
services	  that	  have	  less	  impact	  on	  our	  CI.	  
•  D	  -­‐	  Aging	  factor	  (weigh	  recent	  events	  more	  that	  old	  events	  using	  a	  discount	  factor	  
applied	  to	  each	  event).	  
•  N	  –	  Event	  Number	  
•  S	  –	  Number	  of	  services	  
•  Wi	  –	  Service	  i	  weight	  
•  GT(ﬁnal)	  –	  IncorporaAng	  Operator	  trust	  (TO)	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Behaviour Trust Evaluation (1) 
•  It	  is	  usual	  for	  CIs	  ICT	  system	  to	  gather	  a	  collecAon	  of	  data	  related	  to	  
security	  aspects	  of	  the	  system	  
–  It	  is	  possible	  to	  use	  this	  valuable	  informaAon	  in	  order	  infer	  a	  Trust	  indicator	  on	  
each	  CI	  /	  Service	  behaviour.	  
•  NormalizaAon	  of	  received	  informaAon	  -­‐	  Security	  model	  
•  Security	  Indicators	  can	  be	  evaluated	  based	  on:	  
–  Intrusion	  DetecAon	  System	  
–  QoS	  measurements	  
–  Monitoring	  Systems	  
19 
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Behaviour Trust Evaluation (2) 
•  In	  order	  to	  consider	  aging	  in	  trust	  calculaAon,	  we	  consider	  Ame	  
as	  a	  set	  of	  Ame	  slots.	  Each	  Ame	  slot	  will	  have	  a	  deﬁned	  duraAon	  
and	  	  represents	  an	  Event	  in	  the	  calculaAons.	  	  
–  No	  acAvity	  in	  one	  Ame	  slot	  means	  that	  peer	  behavior	  was	  as	  	  
expected	  so	  the	  maximum	  value	  should	  be	  given	  to	  this	  event.	  
–  If	  alarms	  are	  received	  during	  the	  Ame	  slot,	  the	  esAmated	  value	  for	  the	  	  
slot	  will	  take	  into	  account	  all	  events	  that	  took	  place.	  
–  Size	  of	  Ame	  slot	  should	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  context.	  
–  An	  aging	  factor	  is	  also	  applied.	  
–  A	  PenalizaAon	  factor	  may	  also	  be	  used.	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Behaviour Trust Evaluation (3) 
•  In	  order	  to	  consider	  Ame	  in	  trust	  calculaAon,	  we	  consider	  Ame	  as	  a	  set	  of	  Ame	  
slots,	  each	  one	  represenAng	  an	  event.	  	  
–  Size	  of	  Ame	  slot	  should	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  context	  
•  Behaviour	  Trust	  :	  
	  
	  
•  D	  -­‐	  Aging	  factor	  (weigh	  recent	  events	  more	  that	  old	  events	  using	  a	  discount	  factor	  
applied	  to	  each	  event).	  
•  t	  –	  Time	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Reputation on CI/Service Behaviour  
•  Global	  Trust	  on	  CI	  Behaviour	  :	  
•  D	  -­‐	  Aging	  factor	  (weigh	  recent	  events	  more	  that	  old	  events	  using	  a	  discount	  factor	  
applied	  to	  each	  event).	  
•  t	  –	  Time	  
•  E	  –	  Number	  of	  security	  enAAes	  
•  Wi	  –	  EnAty	  i	  weight	  
•  TBahaviour(ﬁnal)	  –	  IncorporaAng	  Operator	  trust	  (TO)	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Validation (Small scenario) 
•  SimulaAon	  example:	  
–  The	  events	  are	  generated	  using	  a	  normal	  distribuAon	  
–  Threshold	  =10%	  (trust	  values	  above	  90%	  are	  rated	  as	  100%)	  
–  4	  scenarios	  deﬁned:	  
•  (S1)	  The	  system	  behaves	  as	  expected	  with	  only	  small	  errors	  with	  the	  event	  
accuracy	  always	  above	  60%	  and	  mainly	  between	  90%	  and	  100%;	  
•  (S2)	  System	  is	  not	  accurate	  but	  can	  sAll	  be	  trustworthy,	  as	  evaluated	  event	  
accuracy	  is	  always	  above	  40%;	  
•  (S3)	  Received	  alerts	  are	  not	  as	  expected	  with	  above	  40%	  of	  inaccurate	  
indicaAons	  but	  never	  rising	  above	  60%;	  
•  (S4)	  System	  in	  inaccurate.	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Simulation: attack or faulty component situation 
•  Figures	  (A),(B)	  -­‐	  It	  is	  visible	  that	  the	  trust	  indicator	  decreases	  rapidly	  and	  next	  starts	  to	  
grow	  gradually	  depending	  on	  the	  scenario.	  
–  Figure	  (B)	  describes	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Human	  Factor	  showing	  that	  the	  operator	  can	  rapidly	  
change	  the	  trust	  in	  a	  service.	  Less	  informaAon	  is	  used	  for	  this	  simulaAon.	  
•  Figure	  (C)	  –	  Two	  diﬀerent	  services	  (weights:	  0.7	  to	  service	  2,	  0.3	  to	  service	  1).	  	  
–  In	  this	  simulaAon,	  when	  the	  service	  more	  important	  is	  becoming	  unreliable,	  then	  the	  CI	  
reputaAon	  is	  decaying	  even	  when	  the	  other	  service	  is	  trusty.	  
24 
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Simulation: Behaviour Trust 
•  Fig	  (A)	  has	  a	  rate	  of	  1	  event	  per	  hour	  from	  scenarios	  	  S1,	  S3	  and	  S4.	  
–  With	  few	  events,	  the	  indicator	  does	  not	  drop	  below	  60%	  -­‐	  inﬂuence	  of	  the	  slots	  where	  the	  system	  is	  
behaving	  well.	  Demonstrate	  how	  important	  the	  values	  deﬁned	  for	  the	  Ame	  slot.	  
•  Fig	  (B)	  -­‐	  Possible	  amack	  or	  misbehaviour	  in	  a	  small	  period	  of	  Ame.	  
–  First	  300	  minutes	  -­‐	  1	  event/hour	  from	  S1;	  	  Next	  100	  minutes	  -­‐	  5	  event/hour	  from	  S4.	  
•  The	  trust	  indicator	  rapidly	  decays	  below	  50%	  clearly	  indicaAng	  that	  something	  is	  wrong.	  
–  Next,	  the	  behaviour	  is	  simulated	  using	  (S2)	  with	  a	  lower	  event	  rate	  leading	  the	  indicator	  to	  raise.	  
–  	  Between	  the	  800th	  and	  1100th	  minutes,	  the	  scenario	  changes	  to	  (S4)	  with	  a	  event	  rate	  of	  1/60	  minutes.	  
•  	  It	  is	  observable	  that	  even	  with	  only	  a	  few	  events,	  the	  CI	  Operator	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  peer	  behaviour	  is	  
not	  normal.	  
25 
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TRS MICIE Implementation 
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Application to CI Security Model1 
•  CI	  Security	  Model	  
–  CI	  model	  based	  on	  CI	  services	  and	  the	  dependencies	  among	  services	  
–  To	  enable	  on-­‐line	  monitoring	  of	  CI	  service	  risk	  
–  EsAmate	  current	  (on-­‐line)	  risk	  of	  a	  CI	  service	  
•  Real-­‐Ame	  measurements	  deﬁning	  the	  state	  of	  CI	  service	  (base	  measurements)	  
•  EsAmated	  risk	  received	  from	  dependent	  services	  
•  Expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  conﬁdenAality,	  integrity	  and	  availability	  (CIA)	  
–  AggregaAon	  using	  averaged	  weighted	  sum	  method	  
–  Using	  a	  weight	  	  determining	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  enAty	  to	  the	  CIA	  of	  a	  service	  
–  How	  can	  shared	  informa+on	  be	  evaluated	  for	  correctness?	  
1	  Proposed	  by	  Thomas	  Schaberreiter	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CI security modelling - Infrastructure analysis 
•  DecomposiAon	  into	  provided	  services	  
–  Tree-­‐like	  representaAon	  
–  Each	  service	  can	  be	  	  
composed	  of	  sub-­‐services	  	  
and	  infrastructure	  
–  Weight	  sub-­‐services	  	  
according	  to	  their	  	  
contribuAon	  to	  C,I,A	  	  
of	  the	  service	  
	  
•  IdenAﬁcaAon	  of	  base	  measurements	  
–  Weight	  according	  to	  contribuAon	  to	  C,I,A	  of	  the	  service	  
–  Determine	  normal	  behaviour	  and	  allowed	  deviaAon	  from	  normal	  behaviour	  
28 
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Service A Service B
CI BExpert weight
Risk Alert Trust Agent Behaviour Trust Agent
Received risk
CI Bquality-of-service
•  To	  evaluate	  the	  trust	  that	  each	  CI	  as	  on	  received	  risk	  alerts	  (risk	  
alert	  trust),	  an	  enAty	  has	  to	  be	  found	  that	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  
each	  risk	  alert	  for	  the	  evaluaAon	  of	  its	  correctness.	  
–  Local	  risk	  indicators	  can	  be	  aggregated	  that	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  
received	  risk	  alert.	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Trust Based Dependency Weighting 
•  CI	  security	  model	  shortcoming	  
–  The	  weights	  for	  dependencies	  and	  sub-­‐services	  have	  to	  be	  assigned	  by	  
experts	  and	  are	  thus	  prone	  to	  human	  error	  and	  inaccuracies.	  	  
•  Trust	  based	  weighAng	  
–  Calculate	  trust	  for	  the	  risk	  alerts	  received	  from	  each	  (inter)dependent	  CI	  or	  
CI	  service	  and	  to	  combine	  the	  calculated	  trust	  with	  the	  iniAal	  weights	  
assigned	  by	  experts;	  
–  Result	  in	  a	  more	  precise	  esAmate	  of	  the	  inﬂuence	  one	  service	  has	  to	  
another.	  
•  The	  	  weight	  assigned	  by	  an	  expert	  now	  represents	  the	  maximum	  
assumed	  inﬂuence	  a	  dependent	  service	  can	  have	  to	  a	  service.	  
–  According	  to	  the	  current	  risk	  alert	  trust	  provided	  by	  the	  dependent	  
service,	  this	  weight	  can	  be	  lowered	  accordingly.	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Case study: the Grid’5000 project 
 
•  ValidaAon	  example	  -­‐	  Case	  study	  based	  on	  a	  realisAc	  scenario	  
•  The	  Grid'5000	  grid	  plaporm.	  
–  Provides	  a	  fully	  customizable	  testbed	  for	  advanced	  experiments	  in	  areas	  as	  
parallel,	  large-­‐scale	  or	  distributed	  compuAng	  and	  networking.	  
–  	  Grid'5000	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  CI	  involving	  several	  crucial	  security	  
components:	  
•  the	  Puppet	  infrastructure,	  responsible	  for	  the	  conﬁguraAon	  of	  all	  grid	  services	  
within	  Grid'5000;	  
•  the	  Chef	  and	  Kadeploy	  infrastructure,	  which	  pilot	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  
compuAng	  nodes	  of	  the	  plaporm;	  
•  the	  resource	  manager	  of	  Grid'5000	  (OAR);	  
•  the	  network	  backbone,	  operated	  by	  independent	  providers,	  namely	  Renater	  
in	  France	  and	  Restena	  in	  Luxembourg.	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Case study: the Grid’5000 project 
 
•  Components	  are	  distributed	  
among	  a	  set	  of	  nine	  geographical	  
sites	  that	  compose	  Grid'5000	  	  
–  eight	  in	  France	  (Bordeaux,	  
Grenoble,	  Lille,	  Lyon,	  Nancy,	  
Reims,	  Rennes,	  Sophia,	  Toulouse)	  
–  one	  in	  Luxembourg.	  	  
–  extra	  internaAonal	  connecAons	  
to	  Brazil,	  Japan	  and	  the	  
Netherlands	  are	  operated	  via	  the	  
site	  of	  Grenoble.	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Luxembourg-Nancy network segment 
•  Four	  base	  measurements	  were	  idenAﬁed	  that	  characterize	  this	  
network	  segment:	  
–  Latency:	  The	  Ame	  a	  packet	  travels	  from	  source	  to	  desAnaAon	  and	  back	  
again	  (in	  seconds).	  
–  Loss:	  The	  number	  of	  packets	  that	  are	  lost	  while	  measuring	  the	  latency.	  
–  In-­‐Packets:	  The	  number	  of	  packets	  entering	  the	  segment	  (in	  packets/
second).	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Latency dataset for network segment Luxembourg-Nancy 
 
•  To	  create	  an	  interesAng	  example	  with	  the	  exisAng	  data,	  it	  
was	  decided	  to	  lower	  the	  boundaries	  for	  what	  is	  
considered	  a	  risk	  to	  the	  intervals	  illustrated	  in	  the	  
presented	  table.	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Grid’5000 Case study 
•  (A)	  Service	  risk	  for	  network	  segment	  Luxembourg-­‐Nancy;	  
–  Results	  obtained	  by	  using	  previous	  table	  for	  evaluate	  service	  risk	  
•  (B)	  Network	  provider	  quality-­‐of-­‐service	  for	  network	  segment	  Luxembourg-­‐Nancy	  
–  Deﬁned	  values	  represenAng	  the	  measured	  QoS	  for	  the	  received	  servic.	  
•  We	  assume	  that	  a	  risk	  level	  should	  be	  sent	  by	  the	  network	  provider	  at	  ﬁxed	  and	  deﬁned	  
Ame	  intervals	  
–  To	  evaluate	  risk	  alert	  trust,	  we	  deﬁned:	  
•  When	  a	  NaN	  value	  is	  received	  (or	  nothing)	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  risk	  alert	  is	  1	  (no	  risk).	  With	  more	  
consecuAve	  missing	  values,	  the	  received	  risk	  is	  increased	  unAl	  5	  (maximum	  risk).	  	  
•  This	  can	  be	  seen	  dangerous	  	  as	  it	  implies	  that	  the	  worst-­‐case	  is	  assumed	  if	  no	  informaAon	  is	  received.	  This	  is	  
where	  the	  behaviour	  trust	  indicator	  is	  used	  
–  The	  behaviour	  trust	  is	  evaluated	  based	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  informaAon.	  
•  	  If	  NaN	  value	  (or	  nothing)	  is	  received,	  this	  is	  seen	  as	  abnormal	  behaviour	  and	  the	  behaviour	  trust	  is	  lowered	  
(an	  isolated	  missing	  value	  triggers	  a	  behaviour	  event	  with	  a	  value	  of	  80	  (in	  a	  scale	  of	  1..100).	  Next	  
consecuAve	  missing	  values	  trigger	  events	  with	  a	  value	  decreasing	  by	  20.	  Therefore,	  the	  high	  assumed	  risk	  
values	  during	  periods	  where	  no	  informaAon	  is	  received	  will	  have	  less	  inﬂuence	  in	  service	  risk	  esAmaAon.	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Experimental set-up 
 
•  Set-­‐up	  overview	  
•  The	  simulaAon	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  staAsAcal	  simulaAon	  tool	  R.	  
Following	  parameters	  were	  used	  for	  the	  simulaAon:	  
–  Risk	  alert	  trust:	  penalisaAon	  factor	  k	  	  =	  1.25;	  ageing	  factor	  D	  	  =	  0.3.	  
–  Behaviour	  trust:	  Δt=2	  and	  D=0.3.	  
–  Service	  trust:	  β=0.6	  (60%	  risk	  alert	  trust	  and	  40%	  behaviour	  trust).	  


























Details	  on	  how	  risk	  alert	  and	  behaviour	  trust	  are	  computed	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  references	  given	  in	  the	  last	  slide.	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Results 
•  (A)	  The	  behaviour	  trust	  rapidly	  decreases	  where	  	  informaAon	  is	  missing,	  growing	  again	  when	  
the	  system	  behaviour	  goes	  back	  to	  a	  normal	  state.	  
–  Missing	  just	  a	  few	  values	  will	  have	  low	  inﬂuence	  in	  the	  conﬁdence	  we	  have	  in	  the	  received	  risk	  alert.	  
•  The	  measured	  risk	  is	  deﬁned	  as	  1	  except	  for	  the	  interval	  [1000..2000]	  where	  there	  is	  a	  
signiﬁcant	  change	  between	  the	  measured	  service	  risk	  and	  the	  received	  risk.	  	  
–  This	  situaAon	  makes	  the	  risk	  alert	  trust	  indicator	  to	  decrease	  rapidly	  before	  starAng	  to	  grow	  gradually.	  
–  It	  is	  also	  visible	  that	  when	  assuming	  high	  risk	  in	  periods	  where	  no	  informaAon	  is	  received,	  the	  risk	  alert	  
trust	  indicator	  also	  decreases	  due	  to	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  values.	  
•  (B)	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  expert	  has	  given	  a	  maximum	  weight	  of	  80%	  to	  this	  risk.	  With	  the	  
applicaAon	  of	  the	  model,	  the	  ﬁnal	  weight	  (expert*trust)	  value	  will	  change	  gradually	  
depending	  on	  the	  service	  trust	  indicator.	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Results 
•  (A)	  -­‐	  Received	  risk	  assuming	  growing	  values	  when	  informaAon	  is	  missing.	  
•  (B)	  -­‐	  ContribuAon	  that	  both	  trust	  indicators	  (service	  trust)	  and	  the	  expert	  
weight	  have	  on	  the	  ﬁnal	  weighted	  risk	  level.	  
–  When	  the	  service	  trust	  gets	  lower,	  is	  given	  less	  importance	  to	  the	  received	  risk,	  
maintaining	  a	  low	  risk	  level.	  
–  The	  weight	  represents	  the	  impact	  a	  received	  risk	  alert	  has	  to	  the	  aggregated	  risk	  of	  a	  
service.	  
•  	  A	  low	  trust	  in	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  received	  risk	  alerts,	  lowers	  its	  importance	  to	  the	  service.	  
•  Low	  trusteed	  High-­‐risk	  alerts	  will	  then	  	  represent	  only	  a	  low	  risk	  for	  the	  service.	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(A)	  Normalized	  service	  risk	  for	  segment	  Luxembourg-­‐Nancy;	  (B)	  Weighted	  service	  risk	  for	  segment	  Luxembourg-­‐Nancy	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Conclusions 
•  Able	  to	  answer	  quesAons	  like	  “how	  much	  can	  we	  trust	  in	  received	  risk	  alerts	  or	  in	  the	  CI	  
behaviour?”.	  
•  Trust	  and	  ReputaAon	  indicators	  can	  be	  incorporated	  in	  CI	  risk	  assessment	  as	  a	  means	  to	  improve	  
its	  accuracy	  and	  its	  resilience	  to	  inconsistent	  informaAon	  provided	  by	  peer	  CI	  /	  Services.	  
•  MICIE	  System	  manager	  can	  act	  dynamically	  using	  trust	  and	  reputaAon	  indicators	  and	  reacAng	  
autonomously	  when	  those	  indicators	  change.	  	  
•  A	  trust	  based	  approach	  was	  introduced	  to	  evaluate	  the	  correctness	  of	  informaAon	  received	  from	  
dependencies.	  
•  IntegraAng	  the	  security	  model	  with	  the	  trust	  and	  reputaAon	  framework	  allow	  that:	  
–  Trust	  can	  be	  calculated	  from	  aggregated	  risk	  parameters	  and	  does	  not	  need	  to	  access	  actual	  infrastructure	  
informaAon.	  
–  The	  trust	  and	  reputaAon	  calculaAon	  is	  generalized	  and	  can	  be	  applied	  without	  modiﬁcaAon	  to	  any	  CI	  that	  are	  
using	  diﬀerent	  security	  models.	  
•  ValidaAon	  
–  Inaccuracies	  in	  risk	  calculaAon	  can	  be	  captured	  using	  the	  proposed	  indicators	  
–  Real-­‐world	  case	  study	  
–  The	  results	  are	  promising	  an	  in-­‐line	  with	  previous	  simulaAon	  only	  results	  
41 
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